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Abstract
Human capital plays a key role in fostering technology adoption, the major source of eco-
nomic growth in developing countries. Consequently, enhancing the level of human capital
should be a matter of public concern. The present paper studies public education incentives
in an environment in which governments can invest in human capital to facilitate the adop-
tion of new technologies invented abroad or, instead, focus on consumptive public spending.
Although human capital is pivotal for growth, the model reveals that incentives to invest
in public education vanish if a country is poorly endowed with human capital. Rather,
governments of these poorly-endowed countries focus on consumptive public spending. As a
result, while their better-endowed counterparts build up human capital thereby promoting
technology adoption and growth, the growth process in poorly-endowed countries stagnates.
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1 Introduction
Recognizing the importance of human capital for growth, public investment in education has
reached high priority in many countries and received increased attention in academic research
during the last years. While various justifications for governmental involvement in enhancing
human capital exist, a common motivation is the belief that human capital is the key to growth.
Thus, public education that facilitates human capital accumulation is viewed as beneficial as
it directly promotes the growth process. At the same time, recent endogenous growth theories
examining the link between human capital and growth emphasize that human capital fosters
growth through the progress in technological knowledge.1 For most countries and most certainly
for developing countries, technological progress hinges on technology adoption, which is the
process of imitating and adapting technologies invented abroad.2 The link between human capital
and technology adoption was first highlighted by Nelson and Phelps (1966), who contend that
educated workers are better at executing tasks that require adaptation to a changing environment
and, thus, adopt new technologies faster. Among others, this technological view of the benefits
of human capital receives empirical support by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994, 2005) showing that
human capital is an important vehicle for growth through technology diffusion.
Given the crucial role of human capital in promoting growth, one might conjecture that public
investment in education constitutes a major aspect of any growth-promoting policy. Especially
with respect to developing countries one might expect that governments have incentives to spend
on public education in order to foster the process of technology adoption and thereby initiate
growth. However, governments these days have to consider many different objectives and pro-
vide various other public goods and services that do not directly impact growth but nevertheless
contribute to the welfare of residents, such as redistribution and public service delivery. Govern-
ments might even try to realize own objectives and divert resources from the public budget for
entirely selfish, consumptive purposes. In either way, there appears to exist a trade-off between
investing in growth-promoting education and focusing on other consumptive expenditures. This
paper analyzes whether and under which conditions governments actually do promote education
to foster growth. More precisely, it asks the following question: are governments in developing
countries willing to invest in the provision of public education to induce growth or will some
countries rather spend on consumptive public goods?
So far, public education has typically been investigated in models in which human capital
enters the production function and acts as a direct driver of growth.3 However, the recent
1For instance, models along these lines are: Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Benhabib and Spiegel
(1994, 2005), and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
2Empirical studies indicate that frontier growth, that is the creation of new technology, is generated in very
few, relatively rich countries. For most countries, foreign R&D plays a crucial role. Providing an overview over
recent literature on technology diffusion, Keller (2004, p. 776) concludes that ”for most countries, foreign sources
of technology are of dominant importance (90 percent or more) for productivity growth”.
3See e.g., Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), Viaene and Zilcha (2002), and Blankenau
et al. (2007).
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literature on endogenous growth indicates that human capital plays a different role for growth: it
widely supports the view that human capital affects growth through technology adoption. This
different view might influence governmental incentives to actually supplement private human
capital by public education. The present analysis of public education builds on the insights of
modern growth theories that view technology adoption as a costly investment process leading
to new designs or blueprints of intermediate-input goods. In these models, developing countries
benefit from the potential represented by the existing world knowledge only if they exhibit
sufficiently high absorptive capabilities, such as the quality of institutions, human capital, and
financial development (e.g., Howitt, 2000; Aghion et al., 2005; Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005; Howitt
and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005; Sadik, 2008). That is, countries adopt foreign technologies and, hence,
catch up with leaders only if they exceed a certain threshold.
Our model integrates some of the recent findings of the theoretical literature as it exhibits
a threshold effect with regard to human capital. This is in line with several empirical studies
detecting a critical threshold level of human capital that is necessary for successful technology
adoption, such as Borensztein et al. (1998), Xu (2000), Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), and Feyrer
(2008). Above this level, technology diffusion stimulates growth; countries below this level of
human capital lack the capabilities to adopt foreign knowledge.
A number of technology-adoption models featuring threshold effects have concentrated on
the specific role of human capital. Examples include models in which human capital is treated as
exogenously given (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005), models in which human capital accumulation
results as an unintentional byproduct due to externalities (Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005), and
models in which private households finance education (Berdugo et al., 2005). Although previous
studies highlight the importance of human capital in the process of technology adoption, public
education has not been investigated within such a framework. The present paper extends the
existing technology-adoption literature: it endogenizes the formation of human capital by intro-
ducing a public investment decision. Against this background, we analyze whether a government
that can enhance human capital through education expenditures and thereby promote growth is
actually willing to do so.
This paper studies education policies in an endogenous growth model featuring technology
adoption. The analysis considers an open-economy set-up to accommodate the notion that
countries are economically highly integrated nowadays and there is a potential for international
technology spillovers. In the model, firms can imitate technologies invented abroad. The adoption
of new technologies depends on the available human capital in an economy as the latter is
associated with the cost to implement a new technology. Firms weigh up the cost of adopting
against the prospective return from operating a new technology: the higher the educational
attainment, the more likely a country is to advance technologically. The government collects
taxes and can chose between investing in growth-promoting public education and engaging in
non-productive spending, which can be interpreted as either public service delivery or selfish
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government consumption. Based on this modeling approach, the paper explores public incentives
to provide growth-promoting education.
The analysis reveals that the initial level of human capital plays a crucial role in shaping
governmental incentives to invest in education. Since the human capital endowment of individuals
increases the productivity of public education, a higher endowment raises the amount spend by
the government. The resulting rise in the level of human capital reduces the costs of technology
adoption and promotes growth. Countries that are highly endowed with human capital face a
pronounced incentive to invest in public education. Conversely, the model implies that countries
that are poorly endowed abstain from investing in education. This is due to the fact that
for very low endowments of human capital, technology adoption is too costly and firms, thus,
abstain from adopting. Although public investments could increase the level of human capital
above a threshold such that technology adoption is worthwhile, the government is not willing to
do so since the costs of providing the necessary level of public education are too high. Rather,
spending on growth-promoting education is replaced by higher expenditures on non-productive
public goods. As a result, the growth process in poorly-endowed countries stagnates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model set-up with a special
emphasis on the underlying market structure and the process of technology adoption. Section
3 analyzes the optimal education policy a government opts for, while Section 4 discusses the
implications of different policies for the growth process. The last section concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We explore a discrete-time model of small open follower countries. A follower economy is an
economy lagging behind the technology frontier and can, thus, potentially profit from adopting
technologies invented in the advanced part of the world. Technological progress resulting from
technology adoption is positively affected by the available human capital. The follower country
is populated by successive generations with each generation living for one period only. During
this period, an individual first acquires human capital and then works and consumes the entire
net labor income. Governments raise taxes and can allocate resources to public education or
non-productive government spending. While labor is considered immobile, capital moves freely
across borders. We analyze optimal education policy of follower economies in an environment, in
which countries are economically integrated and growth results from technology adoption. More
precisely, optimal policies and growth dynamics are examined, allowing countries to differ with
respect to their initial human capital endowment. This section outlines the different aspects of
the model.
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2.1 Households
Consider successive generations of cohort size L = 1. Each worker has one offspring and is,
hence, also referred to as a parent. However, children are economically irrelevant until they
grow up and enter the working period. Each worker supplies one unit of labor inelastically to
firms in the production sector. Residents only live a single period and do not bequeath any
resources to their children; inhabitants of follower economies, thus, refrain from saving. Rather,
individuals consume their entire wage income net of the proportional labor-income tax τw. While
there is no intergenerational transmission of financial resources, human capital does spill over
from one generation to another. More precisely, every individual born is endowed with et, which
corresponds to the level of human capital of the previous generation, et = ht−1. One can think
of this as an intergenerational spillover capturing the fact that children inherit knowledge and
skills from their parents.
Inherited human capital might be enhanced by public expenditures on education gt. In this
case, at the beginning of every period t and before starting to work, individuals undergo education
given their educational endowment et. The educational process then determines the overall level
of human capital ht that will be productive in the process of technology adoption
ht = e
1−γ
t g
γ
t . (1)
Following Galor and Stark (1994), we assume that the level of human capital cannot decline,
but only increase if it is combined with public investments. Put differently, inherited knowledge
will not get lost in the presence of lacking governmental investment.4 Whether the government
actually provides public education and how much it chooses to invest will be investigated below.
2.2 Market Structure
The research effort of leading economies leads to discoveries and technological improvements,
which advance the technology frontier, indexed by A. Throughout the paper, the frontier is
considered as exogenous, and it advances at the rate ε. The follower country imitates and can,
thus, only adopt technologies that have already been invented in the advanced part of the world.
When modeling the market structure, the paper follows the framework pioneered by Romer
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992).5 There are three main
activities in the economy: a competitive final-good sector produces a homogenous output good;
an intermediate-goods sector produces differentiated capital goods and supplies them to final-
production firms; and an imitation sector adopts the blueprints for the intermediate goods. In
4This implies that public investments in education require some minimum expenditures to actually increase the
level of human capital. We show below that the government is always willing to finance these initial investments
if it decides to engage in public education.
5This framework also forms the basis for a broad range of technology-adoption models, such as Barro and
Sala-i Martin (1997), Howitt (2000), and Aghion et al. (2005).
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the model, technological progress takes the form of quality improvements of the differentiated
capital goods. That is, a new technology corresponds to a new type of intermediate good that
increases the efficiency of production in the final-good sector. Implementing a new technology
necessitates a fixed cost to be incurred by the adoption sector. In the following, a firm operating
in the adoption sector is viewed as the research department of an intermediate-goods firm.
We focus on a number of followers in an open-economy set-up, in which capital is not taxed
at all.6 Followers are assumed to be too small to influence the world interest rate, which can be
supported by the view that the bulk of world capital is invested in and flows between advanced
countries. Compared to this, flows from and to developing countries are small. Therefore, capital
moves freely across borders and can be borrowed at the exogenously given rate r. To simplify
matters, suppose that inhabitants of the follower countries do not save; all capital originates
from the advanced part of the world.7 Consequently, households consume their labor income
while all capital income flows to foreign investors.
Final-Good Firms Production of the homogenous final good Y in any period t is given by8
Y = L1−α
∫ 1
0
A1−αj x
α
j dj, (2)
with 0 < α < 1. xj denotes the amount of the latest version of the intermediate good j used
in the final production while Aj measures the state-of-the-art quality in the follower country
associated with that intermediate good. Note that [0, 1] corresponds to the range of industries
that produce intermediate goods. L labels inelastic labor supply, which is normalized to 1. Thus,
final output Y and per-worker output YL coincide.
In each period, firms operating in the final-good sector solve the following profit-maximization
problem
max
L,xj
L1−α
∫ 1
0
A1−αj x
α
j dj − wL−
∫ 1
0
pjxj dj. (3)
As can be seen, the final good Y serves as the nume´raire good. w is the wage rate paid to
workers, and pj is the rental price for the capital good j. From the viewpoint of the producer,
w and pj are taken as given. The first-order conditions to the maximization problem imply
w = (1− α)Y
L
= (1− α)Y (4)
pj = αL1−αA1−αj x
α−1
j = αA
1−α
j x
α−1
j for all j. (5)
6This assumption is discussed in detail below when describing the government.
7The form of capital holding could easily be altered by introducing a savings rate. Since capital is perfectly
mobile across countries and not taxed in the follower economies, extending the model in this direction would not
change the results.
8Time subscripts are suppressed for the moment.
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The optimality conditions reveal that final-good producers choose input quantities such that the
marginal products equal input prices. The final-good production function along with the profit-
maximizing behavior imply that labor income in the economy totals wL = (1−α)Y and that the
compensation stream to the intermediate-goods sector sums up to
∫
j
pjxj dj = αY . Moreover,
equation (5) expresses the inverse demand function for capital good j, which intermediate-goods
firms take as given.
Intermediate-Goods Firms Each intermediate-goods firm produces a particular type of cap-
ital good. Suppose that a firm incurred the fixed cost required to adopt a certain quality. This
incumbent subsequently acts as a monopolist and collects profits from operating the new tech-
nology. If there were no gains to be realized in the intermediate-goods sector, no firm would be
willing to run a business because of the start-up investment. Once the firm incurred the fixed
set-up cost and, thus, knows the blueprint for an intermediate good, each unit of a specific capital
good xj can be exchanged for one unit of raw capital9 borrowed on the world capital market. Let
us denote raw capital by K =
∫ 1
0
xj dj, indicating that the total amount of intermediate goods
corresponds to overall capital or raw capital K in the economy.
In each period, intermediate-goods monopolists maximize
max
xj
pij = pj(xj)xj − rxj . (6)
pij labels per-period profit of firm j; r represents the rental price of raw capital K. As mentioned
above, the monopolist takes the inverse demand function for capital good j, pj(xj), as given.
Solving yields p′j(xj)xj + pj(xj) = r and can be rearranged to
pj =
1
α
r. (7)
Thus, the intermediate-goods monopolist chooses a price that equals a markup times the rental
cost of capital. Equation (7) indicates that all monopolists sell their capital goods for the
same price: p = pj for all j. Moreover, symmetry with respect to quality A = Aj across
sectors10 implies that x = xj for all j. As the production function of the intermediate-goods
sector involves K =
∫ 1
0
xj dj = x, final output can be rewritten into the standard neoclassical
production function
Y = KαA1−α = k˜αA, with k˜ ≡ K
A
. (8)
9Similarly, Jones (1995), Howitt (2000), and Kumar (2003) assume interchangeability of raw capital and specific
capital goods.
10Symmetry can be sustained for the following reason: it is standard in the literature to assume that the leader’s
knowledge Aj is the same across sectors j at any point in time and that the follower’s initial technology level
Aj,t=0 is independent of the sector j. This implies that each firm in the follower country faces the same decision
problem and, accordingly, implements the same quality level. Symmetry, thus, results as firms face the same
adoption decision and as there is no uncertainty in the technology-adoption process.
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Since total proceeds to the intermediate-goods sector equal
∫ 1
0
pjxj dj = αKαA1−α, equation (7)
can be rearranged to express the relation between the domestic and the world interest rate as
r = α2
(
A
K
)1−α
= α
∂Y
∂K
. (9)
Note the interest rate is lower than the marginal product of capital as entrepreneurs have to be
compensated for setting up a firm. For future reference, note that k˜ = KA =
(
α2
r
) 1
1−α
, which is
a constant.
Considering the price that intermediate-goods monopolists set and the production costs they
encounter, profits earned by each firm in a given period can be stated as
pij = α(1− α)Y = α(1− α)k˜αAj for all j, (10)
where A = Aj is the same across sectors due to symmetry. j subscripts are henceforth suppressed.
Using the definition pi ≡ piA , it follows from (10) that pi = α(1− α)k˜α, with pi being a constant.
The Process of Technology Adoption Consider a single intermediate-goods firm that seeks
to acquire the blueprint for a specific technology. Implementing a newer, better technology re-
quires a non-recurring outlay f˜ undertaken by the adoption department of an intermediate-goods
firm, where f˜ stands for the technology-adjusted quantity devoted to technology adoption.11
These one-time expenses are necessary in order to adapt the technology to the present environ-
ment. Specifically, the technology-adoption cost of a follower country that wishes to implement
the quality level At, at a given point in time, is of the form
f˜t =
1
h˜βt
(
At
At
)σ
, (11)
with β > 0 and σ > 0. On the one hand, this formulation reflects the fact that it is more difficult
and, thus, more expensive to imitate technologies that are more sophisticated relative to the
technology frontier. The ratio representing relative technology captures the idea that the costs
of copying increase as the follower country approaches the global technology frontier. On the
other hand, an increasing level of effective human capital in the economy counteracts the latter
cost increase because a better educated workers can handle new and more complex technologies
more easily. The notion that effective human capital lowers the cost of adoption is captured by
the term h˜, which is defined by h˜ ≡ hA . The term is indicative for the absorptive capacity of a
country and translates into lower costs of adopting.
11Following the standard assumption for technology-adoption models featuring quality improvements in interme-
diate goods, f˜ reflects the technology-adjusted cost required in the adoption process, meaning that f˜ corresponds
to total adoption expenditure divided by A. This assumption is taken in Howitt (2000), Aghion et al. (2005),
and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), for instance, and accommodates the force of increasing complexity: as the
technology level in an economy advances, the required outlays for further improvements increase.
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It is worth highlighting that the imposed type of cost function is consistent with balanced
growth. Further, note that in the model, human capital is solely productive in the adoption
sector but not in the final-goods sector. This corresponds to the idea suggested by Nelson and
Phelps (1966) that an educated labor force copes more easily in a dynamic and technologically
progressive environment and is, therefore, better at adopting new technologies. According to
their view, human capital has a positive effect in the economy only if technology is continuously
improving, meaning that human capital should not enter the final production function directly.12
After the firm incurred the set-up cost, it henceforth knows how to convert a unit of raw
capital into a specific capital good and collects monopoly profits pit. As firms have no initial
resources, the funds to finance the start-up investment originate from the world capital market.
Consequently, technology adoption is only worthwhile if the profits are large enough to cover the
initial adoption costs plus interest payments. Firms wish to expand the technology level if profits
can be realized at the beginning of a period, which gives rise to the following technology-adoption
condition
pit ≥ (1 + r) · f˜
(
At−1, At, h˜t
)
, (12)
where At−1 corresponds to the initial technology level an economy possesses at the beginning of
a new period. Note that profits relevant for the valuation of a specific project last for one period
only. After this period, a new process of technology adoption might start implying that a new
technique is implemented, which renders the old technology obsolete. If this is not the case, that
is in the event of no technology adoption in sector j in the following period, it is presumed that
control of the incumbent firm falls randomly to a foreign investor of the next generation.13
The crucial point concerning the adoption process is whether the technology-adoption condi-
tion is satisfied or not for a given level of human capital in a certain period. If it is, the economy
has an incentive to advance the technology level. Otherwise, the laggard country’s technology
level stagnates at At = At−1. As pointed out above, a higher absorptive capacity makes the
adoption condition more likely to hold. This implies that there exists a threshold level of human
capital above which it is worthwhile for firms to incur technology-investment costs. This thresh-
old level hTAt is the level of human capital for which the technology-adoption condition is just
satisfied. More precisely, at hTAt the adoption condition (12) holds with equality for given values
of At and At−1. Hence, the threshold level is determined by
hTAt =
(
Aβ+σt−1
A
σ
t
1 + r
α(1− α)k˜α
) 1
β
. (13)
If the human capital stock is above this level, the economy adopts new qualities and grows.
Clearly, this threshold level depends negatively on the technology level available in the frontier
12For empirical support of this idea, see Benhabib and Spiegel (1994, 2005).
13A similar assumption can be found in Aghion et al. (2006).
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economies, At. Since At increases over time, technology adoption becomes less costly. Conse-
quently, the level of human capital required to render technology adoption beneficial declines.
The model, hence, predicts that with time, more and more countries face the incentive to engage
in technology adoption and start catching up with leading economies.
In what follows, we briefly outline what happens in the two possible scenarios ht ≤ hTAt and
ht > h
TA
t . It is worth pointing out that the findings discussed in the following correspond to the
decisions taken by private firms for a given level of ht. We illustrate below how the government
chooses to influence the level of human capital in the economy by investing in public education.
No-Technology-Adoption State Suppose the technology-adoption condition is violated, and
the economy encounters ht ≤ hTAt . Consequently, it is not worthwhile for firms to copy new, but
yet unimplemented technologies. The different intermediate-goods firms in period t, therefore,
prefer to stay at their initial technology level At−1. Output in the economy then totals Yt =
k˜αAt = k˜αAt−1. In this case, there are some potential avenues for the follower to escape
from technological stagnation: since the frontier At advances with time, the cost of technology
adoption for a given (constant) level of human capital an eventually drop below the gains from
adopting. Thus, at some point in time, it becomes worthwhile to implement new technologies.
Put differently, the threshold level of human capital declines with time. Other potential channels
include changes that raise the level of human capital as this would improve the absorptive capacity
of a receiving country, thereby stimulating technology adoption.
Technology-Adoption State Suppose ht > hTAt ; that is, potential profits are high enough
to finance the necessary set-up costs. These potential profits induce intermediate-goods firms
to incur the set-up cost to start operating. We make the standard assumption that there is
free-entry into the intermediate-goods market, which results in the elimination of profits in a
present-value sense. This implies that the quality level increases until the following research-
arbitrage condition holds
pit = α(1− α)k˜α = (1 + r) · f˜
(
At, At, h˜t
)
. (14)
Given the underlying cost function, the no-arbitrage condition (14) can be solved for the new
technology level
At =
(
α(1− α)k˜α
1 + r
hβt A
σ
t
) 1
β+σ
, (15)
that results in case technology adoption is worthwhile. Consequently, if there are profits to be
realized at the beginning of a period (meaning that the technology-adoption condition is satis-
fied), firms start expanding the level of technological sophistication up to the quality level stated
in equation (15). However, whether technology adoption is worthwhile from the perspective of a
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firm depends on the exact parameter and variable combination, the distance to the technology
frontier, and the level of human capital that is available in the economy. From the point of view
of an intermediate-goods firm, the level of human capital ht is given. Yet, recall that the current
stock of human capital ht depends positively on the educational endowment et and the effort on
the part of the government gt. This implies that the level of technology ultimately hinges on the
domestic variables et and gt as well as on the technology level of the frontier, At = A(et, gt, At).
2.3 Government
Consider a government or a politician that is in office for a single period only.14 The government
collects taxes levied on wage income whereas mobile capital is not taxed.15 The tax revenue can
be spend on non-productive government spending or on public education, which determines the
level of human capital that enters the technology-adoption process. The government anticipates
this effect on technology adoption when deciding on the optimal level of public education. The
payoff function of the government is formalized as
(1− τw)(1− α)Yt + λcGt , (16)
where τw denotes the income-tax rate, (1−τw)(1−α)Yt corresponds to private consumption and
cGt to unproductive government spending. The governmental payoff function can be interpreted
in two ways allowing us to encompass different views of the government in a single modeling
framework. First, one can think of a situation in which residents not only value private con-
sumption, but to some extent λ also benefit from the provision of public consumption goods and
services. In this case, the government would be benevolent in the sense that it aims at maxi-
mizing the utility of its residents. The above-stated payoff function then reflects the utility of a
country’s inhabitants. In contrast, the payoff function of the government can also be interpreted
as one of a Leviathan. In this case, cGt denotes the amount of rent extraction of a selfish politi-
cian. The degree of selfishness depends on the parameter λ. For illustration, if λ approaches
infinity, the government is purely selfish and cares no longer about private consumption.16
When deciding on the amount of public education, the government has to respect the public
budget constraint
τwwt = τw(1− α)Yt = cGt + gt. (17)
Substituting the budget constraint into the government’s payoff function yields a reduced form
14This ensures that the elected politician and the single household face an identical time horizon. Section 3
discusses the implications of an infinite time horizon of the government.
15The assumption that governments only tax immobile labor and abstain from taxing capital is also taken in
Viaene and Zilcha (2002), for instance. It can be justified by the inefficiency of the taxation of internationally
mobile capital, a well-known result of the literature on optimal taxation that has first been derived by Gordon
(1986) in a static set-up, but was later extended to dynamic frameworks as well (see e.g., Razin and Yuen, 1999).
16The idea of integrating both benevolent as well as Leviathan objectives in a single objective function is due to
Edwards and Keen (1996). In the present model, we follow the approach suggested by Cai and Treisman (2005).
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of the governments optimization problem
max
gt
(1− τw)(1− α)Yt + λ (τw(1− α)Yt − gt) = max
gt
τ(1− α)Yt − λgt, (18)
with τ ≡ 1− τw (1− λ). The income-tax rate is assumed to be exogenously given. This ensures
that the government cannot increase the tax rate on labor to finance growth-promoting education
while holding the level of unproductive spending constant. Rather, a true trade-off between
productive and consumptive government spending arises.17
Since in the presence of internationally mobile capital the production function can be written
as Yt = (1− α)k˜αAt, the government’s optimization problem becomes
max
gt
τ(1− α)Yt − λgt = max
gt
τ(1− α)k˜αAt − λgt. (19)
When solving the optimization problem, we first hypothetically assume that technology adoption
actually takes place. Accordingly, the technology level At is endogenously determined by the
level of public education, the human capital endowment, and the world’s frontier knowledge,
At = A(et, gt, At). Whether technology adoption takes place and which optimal public policies
are actually undertaken will be discussed in the subsequent section.
Given the endogenous level of technology At = A(et, gt, At), maximization yields the level of
public education provision,
g∗t = g
∗(et, At) =
(
ΩA
σ
t e
β(1−γ)
t
) 1
(1−γ)β+σ
, (20)
where Ω ≡
(
τ(1−α)k˜α
λ
γβ
β+σ
)β+σ
α(1−α)k˜α
1+r summarizes the exogenous variables and parameters
influencing educational spending g∗t . Since the variable Ω negatively depends on the valuation of
non-productive government spending, public expenditures on education are lower whenever the
benefit from alternative investments is high, that is if λ is large.
It is important to point out that the initial level of human capital positively affects the
amount of public education: the chosen level of educational spending is higher if the human
capital endowment is higher. Moreover, the level of productive public good provision increases
with the technology available in the frontier economies, At. Recall that the amount of spending
g∗t derived above relies on the hypothetical presumption that adoption actually takes place. Yet,
this need not be the case. The next section examines more closely the decisions taken by the
government under different scenarios.
17It is important to point out that one can easily endogenize the tax rate by eliminating unproductive govern-
ment spending from the model. In this case, the budget constraint reduces to τw(1 − α)Yt = gt, and the payoff
function can be formalized as (1− α)Yt − gt. Comparing the payoff function with equation (18) reveals that the
results of this model specification coincide with our solution when setting τ = 1 and λ = 1. Consequently, the
present modeling approach is more general and encompasses different versions of the problem. Additionally, it
allows to analyze the trade-off between productive and consumptive government spending.
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3 Optimal Public Policies
To analyze the optimal policy from the viewpoint of a small open economy, one needs to dis-
tinguish between different scenarios that might occur in the model. First of all, it is not clear
whether technology adoption is worthwhile and economic growth indeed occurs. Countries at an
early stage of development with a level of human capital endowment et ≤ hTAt will not engage
in technology adoption and will, consequently, not grow at all. Yet, the government can induce
technology adoption and initiate growth by investing in public education to raise the level of
human capital above the threshold level hTAt . Clearly, the government is only willing to do so
if the payoff from providing growth-promoting education exceeds the payoff from abstaining.
Consequently, the optimal policy can be derived by comparing the relevant payoff functions.
In general, the payoff function of the government is given by its objective function P (gt) =
τ(1− α)k˜αAt − λgt. If the government abstains from investing in public education, it saves the
costs of provision (gt = 0), but at the same time it forgoes the growth-promoting aspects of
education. Since the level of human capital ht will remain at et ≤ hTAt , technology adoption at
this early stage of development is too costly and the level of technology remains at At = At−1.
The payoff is, therefore, given by P (gt = 0) = τ(1 − α)k˜αAt−1. In contrast, if the government
decides to provide public education to initiate technology adoption, it will choose a level of
provision of g∗(et, At) and the payoff becomes P (g∗t ) = τ(1 − α)k˜αA(et, g∗t ) − λg∗t . Comparing
the different payoff functions, investment in growth-promoting infrastructure will occur whenever
τ(1− α)k˜αA(et, g∗t , At)− λg∗t > τ(1− α)k˜αAt−1, (21)
with g∗t = g
∗(et, At).18 Since the optimal amount of public spending depends positively on
the endowment level and, moreover, the level of technology is rising as a response to both
higher human capital endowment and public education, the payoff associated with investing is
an increasing function of the endowment level,
τ(1− α)k˜αA(et, g∗t , At)− λg∗t = λ
β(1− γ) + σ
βγ
(
ΩA
σ
t e
β(1−γ)
t
) 1
(1−γ)β+σ
. (22)
In contrast, the payoff of not-investing is constant and independent of et. This implies that there
exists a critical endowment level ecritt above which the government gains a higher payoff if it
engages in growth-promoting public spending
ecritt =
[
∆
ΩA
σ
t
] 1
(1−γ)β
, (23)
18Obviously, investments in public education will only take place if they increase the technology level enough to
compensate for the costs of provision. This implies that the amount of public education needs to be sufficiently
high to actually increase the level of human capital. As a consequence, it is guaranteed that if the government
chooses to invest after comparing the relevant payoffs according to equation (21), it will always finance the
minimum expenditures needed to raise the level of human capital.
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where ∆ ≡
(
τ(1−α)k˜α
λ
γβ
(1−γ)β+σAt−1
)(1−γ)β+σ
comprises all exogenously given parameters. One
can easily show that the critical endowment level is larger if non-productive public goods are
highly appreciated: as the valuation of consumptive spending λ increases, it becomes more
difficult to generate the same utility gain by facilitating technology adoption. Accordingly,
the critical endowment level above which productive public spending becomes attractive rises.
Moreover, the critical endowment level depends negatively on the technology frontier At: as At
increases with time, technology adoption becomes less costly and starts at a lower threshold of
human capital hTAt . Consequently, it becomes cheaper for the government to lift the economy
above this threshold and induce growth. The model, hence, predicts that with time, more and
more countries face the incentive to invest in education and, thus, start growing.19
Figure 1 illustrates the different payoff functions for the two cases, holding At constant for
the moment. The bold line represents the payoff the government can obtain if it does not invest
in public education. Since the level of human capital is too low to make technology adoption
worthwhile, At resembles the level of technology already acquired in the previous period, At−1.
The payoff of the government in this case can be represented by a straight, constant line. The
dashed curves display the payoff function in case the government does invest in education and is
based on the assumption that the level of technology is given by the endogenous level A(et, gt, At).
Since the payoff function depends positively on the human capital endowment, the shape of the
curves depicted in Figure 1 vary for different levels of human capital endowment et.
The lowest dashed line is drawn for a rather low human capital endowment elowt . It illustrates
a combination in which the payoff is below P (gt = 0), even at the point of maximization.
This indicates that if the human capital endowment is very low, the government prefers the
higher payoff associated with gt = 0 (bold line). Therefore, if et is too low, the government
does not care about education and spends the entire tax revenue on consumptive government
expenditures. Any incentive to invest in human capital vanishes and the economy stays at At−1.
In contrast, the upper dashed line depicts a situation in which the government is inclined to
enhance the level of human capital and with it the technology level since the respective payoff
is clearly above P (gt = 0). The government will, therefore, spend the amount g∗t on public
education. Furthermore, Figure 1 visualizes that there exists a critical endowment level, that
is a minimum human capital endowment ecritt above which the government starts to care about
public education. This critical endowment level is given by the payoff function that is tangent
to the payoff in the no-investment case.
Summarizing, at low initial human capital endowments the government has no incentives to
invest in education and, thus, chooses to refrain from providing any public education, gt = 0. In
this case, both the level of human capital and the available technology remain constant, that is
19Note that from the point of view of the government, sustaining this catch-up process in the long run is only
beneficial if the gains involved are large enough to compensate for the costs of public good provision. To ensure
this, we assume that the rate of frontier growth is sufficiently high with 1 + ε >
(
β+σ
(1−γ)β+σ
)(β+σ)/β
.
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Figure 1: Payoffs for various et
ht = et and At = At−1, meaning that the economy stagnates. Conversely, for sufficiently high
initial endowments et > ecritt , the government opts for enhancing the available human capital
in the economy by investing g∗(et, At). When the economy faces et > ecritt , the outcomes are,
thus, defined by the solution to the maximization problem that relied on the assumption that
technology adoption is worthwhile.
The results indicate that, although human capital is the key for a country’s economic pros-
perity, this is no guarantee that governments actually choose to invest in education by supplying
this growth-enhancing public good. This is due to the fact that lifting the level of human capital
above the threshold such that technology adoption becomes beneficial can be extremely costly
for the government. Consequently, at early stages of development where the human capital en-
dowment is very low, it is more attractive to simply consume the entire tax revenue. It is worth
noting that this is independent of the underlying view of the government. Even an entirely
benevolent government that acts in the best interest of its residents will refrain from investing in
education at very low stages of development: since residents value non-productive public goods
and services, it is more attractive to focus on consumptive spending than to incur very high costs
for a negligible technological progress.
Further, a remark regarding the time horizon of the government might be in order. Recall
that, in our model, the government lives for one period only. The horizon of the government is of
the same length as the one of the private agents to accommodate the notion that members of the
government are of the same type as the economically active individuals or that the government
has to receive electoral support from its inhabitants. We deem treating the government and
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the households symmetric with respect to the time horizon most convincing. Yet, since the
government only takes into account the current period in its optimization problem, it can be
considered as myopic. A forward-looking government would take into account the positive effect
of current educational investment on future generations and, thus, incentives to invest in human
capital would be higher. However, it should be emphasized that our results continue to hold
under a forward-looking government, even if it values future discounted payoffs with an infinite
horizon. A forward looking government recognizes the direct positive effect of investments on
the level of human capital plus the indirect effect of a higher productivity of public investments
in the next period that results from a rise in next period’s human capital endowment. Yet,
while the benefits of public good provision increase, the potential payoff continues to depend on
the initial endowment level implying that there still exists a critical threshold of human capital
endowment below which the government finds it optimal not to invest in a certain period. A
very low human capital endowment level severely constrains the government’s possibilities and
creates a strong disincentive to invest caused by the cost g, which can be so profound that the
government abstains from investing in education. Of course, with a forward-looking government,
the critical level of human capital endowment is lower, but it continues to exist.
4 Growth Analysis
The findings concerning the optimal educational investment from the viewpoint of the government
have important repercussions on the growth prospects of developing countries. This section
explores the interplay between education policies and growth. It first focuses on the implications
on the accumulation of human capital over time and then transfers these insights to the analysis
of growth in output.
As discussed before, the government abstains from enhancing human capital if the human
capital endowment is below the critical level ecritt . In this case, human capital remains constant,
and the ratio htht−1 equals 1. On the other hand, if the economy is above the threshold, the human
capital evolution obeys
h∗t
ht−1
=
g∗γt e
1−γ
t
et
=
(
g∗t
et
)γ
=
(
Ω
(
At
et
)σ) γ(1−γ)β+σ
. (24)
Figure 2 visualizes the outcomes from the payoff considerations and the analysis of the ratio
ht
ht−1
. It illustrates the finding that below a critical endowment level, human capital remains
at the inherited level. Above the critical level, policies and the ratio htht−1 are determined by
the optimization behavior of the government, that is by (24). Figure 2 allows for two ways of
interpreting.20 On the one hand, the illustration can be seen as a snapshot image of a world
20As shown below, the model predicts that the level of domestic knowledge A grows at the rate of the frontier
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Figure 2: Outcomes for various et
consisting of a number of small followers that solely differ with respect to their educational
endowment et; otherwise, they are treated identical in the graph. Figure 2 depicts a specific
period t in which At is given. Countries that are located below the critical level ecritt display
zero human capital growth whereas countries above the critical level build up human capital.
Consider now those economies that exceed the critical endowment level. As can be seen, human
capital growth in countries at lower stages of development, corresponding to moderate levels of
et, is more pronounced than the progress in more developed followers. This property gives rise
to catch-up behavior of less developed economies.
On the other hand, Figure 2 can be interpreted in a dynamic way. For this purpose, consider
a single economy evolving through time. First, note that in the long run, an economy exhibits
balanced growth. From h
∗
t
ht−1
stated in (24), it is obvious that, under balanced growth, human
capital advances at the rate of the technology frontier ε. Thus, in the long-run equilibrium, the
term htht−1 equals 1+ε, and the ratio
At
et
is constant (marked by
(
At
et
)∗
lg
in Figure 2). To illustrate
the evolution of an economy through time, consider a poorly-endowed economy that is initially
below the critical endowment level. As discussed above, the expanding level of frontier knowledge
At shifts the required critical level ecritt gradually down, corresponding to a leftward movement
of the line labeled ’critical endowment’. At some point, the economy surpasses the critical value.
The government then starts to invest in public education, and the economy’s law of motion is
governed by h
∗
t
ht−1
, that is by the curved line. Given that the curved line is clearly above 1 + ε
A in the long run, which implies that the ratio
(
A
A
)∗
lg
is constant under balanced growth. The figure implicitly
presumes that the initial value of At−1 is below its balanced-growth relationship.
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at intermediate levels of initial human capital, this indicates that human capital grows faster
than the technology frontier although at a declining rate. This corresponds to a rightward slide
along the curved line. From period to period, the economy accumulates human capital faster
than the frontier expands and, thus, catches up until it reaches the long-run equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, human capital grows at the same pace as the technology frontier. To summarize,
our model implies that more and more countries grow with time and, additionally, it suggests
that late starters grow more rapidly than countries that started their pursuit of leaders earlier
on.
The analysis above has focused on the evolution of the human capital stock. Yet, one can
easily transfer the insights to growth in output and technology. From the production function
Yt = k˜αAt, it is apparent that growth rates of final production Yt and technological knowledge
At coincide: YtYt−1 =
At
At−1
. As noted above, countries that lie below the critical human capital
endowment level stagnate economically, involving At = At−1 and Yt = Yt−1. For all other
economies, growth in production and technology is given by
A∗t
At−1
=
(1 + ε)σ (Ω(At
et
)σ) βγ(1−γ)β+σ
1
β+σ
=
((
At
At−1
)σ (
h∗t
ht−1
)β) 1β+σ
, (25)
which arises from analyzing the level of technology of two consecutive periods. As the stock
of human capital under balanced-growth progresses at the frontier growth rate ε, it is obvious
that the growth rate of domestic technology is constant in the long run and corresponds to ε as
well. Depicting AtAt−1 would yield a similar picture as the one for human capital: analogously,
at intermediate levels of development, that is for economies just above the critical threshold,
growth in technology and, accordingly, output exceeds the progress in world frontier knowledge.
Again, this suggests that a follower economy catches up with growth in more advanced countries
and gains substantially once it has surmounted the critical threshold level. Conversely, poorly-
endowed countries do not grow at all.
5 Conclusion
In view of the substantial role of human capital in promoting economic growth, the present
paper studies whether governments in developing countries are actually willing to invest in the
provision of public education to enhance the growth process or, rather, engage in unproductive
public spending. To account for the high relevance of technology adoption, the major driver
for growth in developing countries, the paper puts forward a growth model in which follower
countries can adopt more advanced technologies from the rest of the world. The costs that
arise when firms aim at implementing new and more complex technologies crucially impact the
process of technology adoption. Human capital is conducive to technology adoption as it plays a
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critical role in reducing these costs. Therefore, by providing public education that enhances the
level of human capital, governments can influence the process of technology adoption and, thus,
stimulate economic growth. Against this background, the paper analyzes whether governments
are actually willing to provide public education or whether they alternatively prefer to engage
in consumptive public spending.
The results contrast with the common belief that governments wish to engage in public
education in any circumstance once the technological view of the benefits of human capital and
the role of initial endowments are taken into account. Even though human capital plays a key
role in economic development via its positive effect on technology adoption, governments do not
necessarily engage in the provision of public education. Only if the human capital endowment
exceeds a certain threshold, governments opt for building up human capital, thereby fostering
the acquisition of technological knowledge and promoting growth. For poorly-endowed economies
incentives to invest in human capital might be absent. That is, governments in such economies
might refrain from investing in growth-enhancing public education. This is due to the fact that
lifting the level of human capital above a threshold such that technology adoption becomes
beneficial is extremely costly for the government. Instead, governments maximize their payoff by
focusing on consumptive public spending. Yet, abstaining from human-capital enhancement to
engage in other, consumptive public expenditures implies that the process of technology adoption
receives no boost. Consequently, poorly endowed regions fail to adopt new technologies and their
growth process stagnates.
As the model can account for the observed convergence among growing economies as well as
the divergence between these countries and the poor, stagnating economies, it is consistent with
the well-documented convergence-club feature of the world income distribution. While recent
technology-diffusion models exhibiting a threshold effect also generate the convergence-club fea-
ture but consider public schooling as given, our study endogenizes human capital accumulation.
It thereby adds a public economics argument that explains why it might be optimal for the
government not to invest in education but to remain in the lower income club.
Certainly, there exist other reasons justifying why governments provide public education aside
from its growth-enhancing aspect, such as establishing equality of opportunity. In reality one
can, therefore, not expect to actually observe a complete lack of public investments but rather a
lower level of spending as the growth-facilitating motive for public education is absent in poorly-
endowed countries. Consequently, on the basis of the present model results, it is plausible to
conjecture that public investments in education in these poorly-endowed countries are too low
to affect the growth process. This is in line with the recent empirical finding by Blankenau
et al. (2007) who document that the governmental commitment to educational spending is much
smaller in poorer economies and detect a robust positive effect of public education expenditures
on growth in rich countries but no effect in poor countries.
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